









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































yc,p, t = αp, t + βc + θ × postt × shockc
+ ∑
s=2001
2003 γs × shockc × year st + ρ ×Xc, t + εc,p, t
yc,p, t = αp, t + βc
+ ∑
s=2001
2007 θs × shockc × year st







































































































































变量 cpei，t，如果 i县在 t年实施了“强县扩权”改革，
则 t年及之后年份设 cpei，t=1，否则为 0；“省直管县”
变量 pmci，t，如果 i县在 t年实施了“省直管县”改革，
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Will Individual Income Tax Cut Increase Labor Supply?
Ye Jingjing and other authors
According to Decree NO.600th of the State Council of the People’s Republic of China, China raised the threshold
of individual income tax and reduced the tax tiers in September 1, 2011. This paper focuses on evaluating the impact
of the implementation of the Law on the individual labor supply and further explores the role on the income distribu⁃
tion gap. Using the Chinese Household Finance Survey(CHFS)2011-2013 panel data, we apply the difference-in-differ⁃
ence method and fixed effect model, and take reference to the regression discontinuity design. We find this individual
tax reform improves the individual labor force participation, but has no significant effect on the labor hours. Especially,
the labor incentive of high income groups is higher than that of low income groups. Therefore, the income tax cut will
improve China’s overall labor supply, but not help to reduce the residential income gap.
Chinese“ Pressure-Type”Fiscal Incentives and Local Fiscal Resource Growth
Xie Zhenfa, Yan Jin and Li Pei
Local governments face complex and diverse pressures from various resources under Chinese pressure system dur⁃
ing the period of economic and social transition. Extracting fiscal revenues actively is the main way for local govern⁃
ments to cope with pressures, which forms Chinese“ pressure-type”fiscal incentives. Using the nation-wide abolition
of agriculture tax in 2005 as the quasi-experiment of fiscal revenue pressures and the difference-in-difference models,
the paper explores empirically the effect of fiscal pressures on local fiscal resource growth. The empirical results show
that a county, which suffered more public revenue loss due to the agriculture tax abolition among the same prefecture,
would have more industries’outputs. However, these results were not driven from the incentives of taxation structure
changes, but more from the incentives of fiscal pressures. The effects arose in the county with weaker industrial base





How Does Cognitive Fixation Affect Innovation?
An Empirical Examination of Image Ideation Crowdsourcing
Yang Guang and Wang Li
Innovation is the engine of social progress. Innovators face many difficulties and challenges during the practice. Nu⁃
merous studies have shown that cognitive fixation will limit people's minds and reduce the quality of creation. Cogni⁃
tive fixation could be developed from innovators’own experience or other people's experience. There are few studies
that focus on the impacts of different types of cognitive fixation on creativity and how different cognitive fixation inter⁃
act with each other. Specifically, we borrow the theory of cognitive fixation from psychology and use a 6-year panel da⁃
ta of individual user’s ideation from a“ crowdsourcing”clothing company to empirically examine the effects of users
’own past success, the success of other users and the interaction of the two types of cognitive fixation on users’fu⁃
ture success. We find that: (1) for users without prior success, the cognitive fixation formed by other users’successes
raises the likelihood of success for their future ideation; (2) the cognitive fixation from own past success lowers the like⁃
lihood for future success; (3) for users with success experience, the cognitive fixation formed by other users’success
can alleviate the negative effects brought by the fixation from own past successes. We contribute to the literature by dis⁃
tinguishing two types of cognitive fixation from own and other users’success and studying their differentiated and in⁃
teractive effects on users’future success. We also explore the potential mechanism underlying the findings.
Insider Advantage: Empirical Evidence from Firm’s Personnel Data
Zhang Hong, Zhou Li’an and Liang Jianzhang
This paper explores the company's choice between external hiring and internal promotion when a job is vacant. We
find that the insiders are preferred by firms when there is an open position, with less general human capital, lower wag⁃
es and lower likelihood to be promoted than their outsider counterparts, which implies a handicap on outsiders in the
recruitment. And the handicap disappears as the job level increases and vary with job categories. Furthermore, this pa⁃
per also discusses the mechanism behind the advantages of such internal staff, and demonstrates that the management
defense, dedicated human capital, and the championship competition mechanism are the reasons that lead to the advan⁃
tages of the insiders. The competition mechanism of the championship is the main reason. We find that: It is expected
that job openings have a negative impact on the existing staff's efforts and opening up to the outside will make existing
staff more likely to voluntarily leave after realizing that the promotion path is no longer smooth. At the same time, other
mechanisms can only explain at most a small part of the insider advantage.
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